C.S.Lewis sobre las tiranías morales

De todas las tiranías, la tiranía más opresiva es quizás aquella que se ejerce sinceramente por el bien de sus víctimas. Tal vez sea mejor vivir sometidos a  ladrones corruptos que bajo entrometidos morales todopoderosos. La crueldad del ladrón corrupto puede a veces sosegarse, su avaricia puede en algún momento saciarse. Pero aquellos que nos atormentan por nuestro propio bien nos atormentarán sin fin, pues lo hacen con la aprobación de su propia conciencia.

Ellos pueden ser más propensos a ir al cielo pero al mismo tiempo más proclives a hacer un infierno de la tierra.

Esta bondad implica un insulto intolerable. «Curarnos” en contra de nuestra voluntad y curarnos de estados que quizás no consideramos una enfermedad es colocarnos en el nivel de aquellos que no han alcanzado aún la edad de la razón o aquellos que nunca la alcanzarán: ser clasificado junto a los niños, los deficientes mentales y los animales domésticos

Sobre la izquierda y los trabajadores

Es muy fácil. La izquierda nunca ha sido el pueblo. De Marx a Pablo Iglesias, los líderes nunca han sido de clase trabajadora. Los líderes de la izquierda es un grupo de personas que han recibido educación superior (intelectuales, funcionarios). Está compuesta por hijos de la clase media que quieren el poder para medrar (Stalin, Pablo Iglesias) e hijos de la clase alta que buscan un sentido a sus vidas o quitarse la culpa de ser ricos (Engels, Carolina Bescansa).

Hasta hace unas décadas, la izquierda usaba a los trabajadores como excusa para llegar el poder. Cuando los trabajadores se creen las promesas de la izquierda, esta puede presentarse como defensora del pueblo (Perón). Cuando no, puede matar al pueblo (Stalin mató a 10 millones de campesinos) o sustituirlo (en nuestros tiempos, la izquierda fomenta la baja natalidad entre nativos mientras fomenta la inmigración, pues los inmigrantes votan izquierda).

Hace unas décadas la izquierda se dio cuenta que ponerse del lado de los trabajadores no le permitía obtener los jugosos fondos que da el poder financiero. Entonces abandonó a los trabajadores a su suerte y cambió por una alianza de grupos cuyas reivindicaciones le convienen al poder financiero (gays, inmigrantes, feministas, etc). Así podían conseguir poder y dinero haciéndose los rebeldes y los buenos, que es de lo que se trata.

Monogamy and its discontents; challenge to western sexual values

«Monogamy and its discontents; challenge to western sexual values»

by William Tucker

Originally published in National Review (1993), reprinted here: <http://www.snappingturtle.net/jmc/tmblog/archives/005331.html>

Why sexual morality, apart from religious edict? As both the highest and lowest strata of our society demonstrate, a culture abandons monogamy only at its peril.

«It is remarkable that, little as men are able to exist in isolation, they should nevertheless feel as a heavy burden the sacrifices that civilization expects of them in order to make a communal life possible.» –Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion

AMERICA IS in a period of cultural crisis. For as long as we have been a civilization, monogamy, heterosexuality, legitimacy, and the virtues of marital fidelity have been givens of nature. The major religions have sanctioned them, as do four thousand years of Western history. Out-of-wedlock births, homosexuality, and other forms of sexual «deviance» have always existed, but have never laid claim to the mainstream.

All this is now coming under challenge. Part of it may simply be cultural exhaustion–the foolish confidence that the major battles of civilization have been fought and won and that it is now time for a little self-indulgence. Or it may be that the taste for the exotic and forbidden, usually confined to a small minority, has at last become available to the average person.

All this must be tolerated. In a free country, you can’t stop people from doing what they want, especially when they have the money and leisure to do it. The situation is complicated, however, by the existence of a vast American «underclass» that does not generally share in the affluence, but is daily exposed to the sirens of self-indulgence. While the abandonment of cultural norms may have an exotic quality for the affluent, it is a palpable threat to the upward aspirations of the poor.

On the matter of single motherhood and illegitimacy, members of the underclass–particularly those of African-American origin have proved peculiarly susceptible. Single motherhood has virtually become the norm in African-American society. (Over 65 per cent of black children are now born out of wedlock.) The failure to adhere to monogamy and two-parent child-rearing now forms the single greatest obstacle to the advancement of America’s underclass.

Yet to speak in favor of monogamy, sexual modesty, fidelity, restraint, and two-parent families in the current cultural climate is to find oneself subject to the charge of being a bigot, a religious nut, or just hopelessly out of touch. The common assumption, particularly among the intelligentsia, is that all the traditional arguments for monogamy and two-parent families are religious and that everything that could be said in their favor was spoken centuries ago.

Monogamy Misunderstood

I CANNOT AGREE. For as much as monogamy has been sanctioned by Western culture, I do not believe that its function as the center of our civilization has ever been completely understood. There is in everyone a vague awareness that monogamy produces a peaceful social contract that is the framework for cultural harmony and economic advancement. Yet this subconscious recognition has rarely been explored at any great length. There is never any real articulation that monogamy is an ancient compromise whose breakdown only lets loose antagonisms that society has long suppressed. Monogamy, after all, is only one possible outcome of the age-old sexual dance. There are others, whose characteristics may not be quite so appealing.

Yet like all hard-won compromises, monogamy does not produce a perfect outcome for every individual. When examined closely, it proves to be the source of many private dissatisfactions, which form a nagging undercurrent of discontent in any monogamous culture. Ordinarily, these disaffections remain a form of «deviance,» generally suppressed and disapproved by the vast majority, although virtually impossible to eradicate. Only when the core ideals of the culture come under attack–when people begin to celebrate these discontents and embrace them within themselves–only then does the underlying architecture of the social contract come into stark relief.

The question that we face today is how much free rein we can give the discontents of monogamy before we risk overturning the central character of our culture. Society, of course, is not without its defenses. The longstanding, almost universal dislike and disapproval of child-bearing out of wedlock, of sexual infidelity, of easy divorce, of public prostitution and pornography, and of widespread, blatant homosexuality–these are not just irrational intolerances. They are the ancient, forgotten logic that holds together a monogamous society. As long as these attitudes remain unexamined, however, they can play little part in the current debate and will be easily dismissed as mere prejudices.

What we need, then, is a defense of monogamy based on a rational understanding of its underlying principles. Here is an attempted beginning.

The Arithmetic of Reproduction

LET US START with some basic arithmetic. In any reproducing population, the laws of chance dictate that there will be about the same number of males and females. There are thus three ways in which the population can arrange itself for mating purposes: 1) polyandry, in which one female collects several males as mates; 2) polygyny (often called, less precisely, polygamy) , in which one male collects several females; and 3) monogamy, in which each female and each male mate with only one other individual.

Of the three possibilities, the first–polyandry–is the rarest in nature. An understanding of the basics of reproduction tells us why.

In nearly all species, the female role in reproduction is the «limiting factor.» This has to do with the differences between eggs and sperm. Sperm are small and motile, while eggs are large and relatively immobile. The egg generally comes wrapped in a package of nutrients that will feed the fertilized ovum until «birth.» Because eggs are more complex–and therefore harder to manufacture–a female generates far fewer eggs than a male generates sperm. (Among mammals, a single male ejaculation often contains more sperm cells than a female will produce eggs in her lifetime.) Since there are always more sperm than eggs–and since it takes one of each to produce an offspring–eggs are the limiting factor to reproduction.

As a result, females have generally gone on to play a larger role in nurturing offspring as well. The principle that determines this responsibility has been identified by biologists as the «last chance to abandon.» Here is how it works.

When fertilization of the egg takes place, one partner is usually left with the egg in his or her possession — often attached to or within his or her body.

Most often, this is the female. This leaves the male free to go and seek other mating opportunities. The female, on the other hand, has two basic options: 1) she can abandon the egg and try to mate again (but this will only leave her in the same dilemma); or 2) she can stay with the egg and try to nurture it to maturity. The latter is a better reproductive strategy. As a result, females become «mothers,» caring for the fertilized eggs, and often the newborn offspring as well.

The few exceptions prove the rule. Among seahorses, the fertilized egg is nurtured in a kangaroo-like pouch on the male’s stomach. This makes the male the limiting factor to reproduction. As a result, the sex roles are reversed. Male seahorses become «mothers,» nurturing their offspring to maturity, while females abandon their «impregnated» sexual partners and look for new mating opportunities.

The logic of reproduction has produced another universal characteristic in nature, called «female coyness.» Males can spread their sperm far and wide, impregnating as many females as possible, while females may get only one mating opportunity per season. Therefore, females must choose wisely. In almost every species, males are the sexual aggressors, while females hold back, trying to select the best mate. Often the male is made to perform some display of strength or beauty, or go through some ritual expression of responsibility (nest-building) before the female agrees to mate with him. With seahorses, once again, the roles are reversed. Males are coy and reluctant, while females are the sexual aggressors.

It is for these reasons that polyandry–one female forming a mating bond with several males–is uncommon and unfavorable. Even though a single female might consort with several males, she can only be impregnated by one or two of them. Thus, most males would be unsuccessful. Moreover, the attachment of several males to one female would mean that other females would be left with no mates. The outcome would be a very slow rate of reproduction. In addition, any male who broke the rules and left his mate for an unmated female would achieve reproductive success, making the whole system extremely unstable. For all these reasons, polyandry is very rare in nature.

Polygyny, on the other hand–the form of polygamy where one male mates with several females–is universally common. (Although » polygamy » can refer to either polyandry or polygyny, it is generally used interchangeably with polygyny.) Polygamy is probably the most «natural» way of mating. It is particularly predominant among mammals, where the fertilized embryo is retained within the female’s body, reducing the male’s post-conception nurturing to near-zero. Given the differences in size, strength, beauty, or social skills among males, it is inevitable that–in an unregulated sexual marketplace-successful males will collect multiple mating partners while unsuccessful males will be left with none. A successful male lion collects a pride of seven to ton female lions, mating with each of them as they come into heat. A male deer mates with about six to eight female deer. A silverback male gorilla collects a harem of five or six female gorillas. Biologists have even determined that the sexual dimorphism in a species–the size difference between males and females–is directly correlated to the size of the harem: i.e., the bigger the male is in relation to females, the more females he will control. On this scale, we are «slightly polygamous,» with male humans outweighing females enough to collect about one and a half mates apiece.

Polygamy’s Winners and Losers

POLYGAMY CREATES a clear social order, with distinct winners and losers. Let us look at how this works. A dominant male wins because he can reproduce with as many females as he can reasonably control. Thus, he can «spread his genes» far and wide, producing many more progeny than he would be able to do under a different sexual regime.

But low-status females are winners, too. This is because: 1) Even the lowest-status females get to mate; there are no «old maids» in a polygamous society. 2) Nearly all females get access to high-status males. Since there are no artificial limits on the number of mates a male can collect, all females can attach themselves to a few relatively desirable males.

The effect upon high-status females is approximately neutral, but the clear losers are low-status males, the «bachelor herd» that is shut out of the mating equation. In some species, like elephants, the bachelor herd forms a dispirited gaggle living relatively meaningless lives on the edge of society. In others, like various monkeys, the subdominants form all-male gangs that combine their efforts to steal females from successful males. In a highly social species, such as baboons, the bachelor herd has been incorporated into the troop. Subdominant males form a «centurion guard» that protects the dominant male and his harem from predators. Among themselves, meanwhile, they engage in endless status struggles, trying to move up the social ladder toward their own mating possibilities.

Altogether, then, polygamy is a very natural and successful reproductive system. Since all females mate, the reproductive capacity of the population is maximized. There is also a strong selective drive toward desirable characteristics. As the operators of stud farms have long known, allowing only the swiftest and strongest males to breed produces the most desirable population.

Yet despite the clear reproductive advantages of polygamy, some species have abandoned it in favor of the more complex and artificially limiting system of monogamy. Why? The answer seems to be that monogamy is better adapted to the task of rearing offspring. This is particularly true where living conditions are harsh or where the offspring go through a long period of early dependency. The task is better handled by two parents than one. Quite literally, a species adopts monogamy «for the sake of the children.»

Among animals, the most prominent example is birds. Because the fertilized egg is laid outside the female’s body, a long period of nesting is required. This ties the male to the task of nurturing. Most bird species are monogamous through each mating season, and many mate for life.

Once mammalian development moved the gestating egg back inside the female’s body, however, the need for «nesting’ disappeared. With only a few exceptions (beavers, gibbons, orangutans), mammals are polygamous.

Yet as human beings evolved from our proto-chimp ancestors, the record is fairly clear that we reinvented monogamy. Present-day hunter-gatherers–who parallel the earliest human societies–are largely monogamous. Only with the invention of horticulture did many societies around the world revert to polygamy. Then, when animals were harnessed to the plow and urban civilizations were born, human societies again became almost exclusively monogamous. This wandering pattern of development has been the cause of much confusion. When monogamous Western European civilizations discovered the primitive polygamies of Africa and the South Seas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they assumed that the earliest human civilizations had been polygamous and had later evolved into the «higher» pattern of monogamy. It was only with the discovery of monogamous hunter-gatherers that the mystery was finally resolved. Rather than being an earlier form, polygamy is actually a later development in which many cultures have apparently become sidetracked. Both the earliest and the most advanced (economically successful) human civilizations are generally monogamous.

What has made monogamy so successful a format for human cooperation? First and foremost, monogamy creates a social contract that reduces the sexual competition among males. The underlying assumption of monogamy is that every male gets a reasonable chance to mate. As a result, the do-or-die quality of sexual competition among males abates. When one male can collect many females, mating takes on a deadly intensity. With monogamy, however, a more democratic outcome is assured. The bachelor herd disappears.

Second, because monogamy assures the possibility of reproduction to every member of the group, a social contract is born. One need only consider the sultan’s harem–where male guards must be eunuchized–to realize that a society that practices polygamy has an inherently non-democratic character. No offer can be extended to marginal or outcast members that entices them to be part of the group. Under monogamy, however, society can function as a cohesive whole.

This is why, under monogamy, other forms of cooperation become possible. Males and females may pair off, but they also maintain other familial and social relationships. Both males and females can form task-oriented groups (in primitive societies, the line between «men’s» and «women’s work» is always carefully drawn). As society becomes more complex, men and women frequently exchange roles and, although there is always a certain amount of sexual tension, males and females can work together in non-mating settings.

Other social primates have never reached the same level of complexity. Gibbons and orangutans are monogamous–but almost too much so: mated pairs are strongly attached to each other, but live in social isolation, rarely interacting with other members of the species. Gorilla bands generally ignore each other–except when males raid each other’s harems. Baboon troops are more organized and task oriented, often encompassing as many as fifty to a hundred individuals. But behavior is rigidly hierarchical. Females are kept at the center of the troop, under close supervision of the alpha male and his associates. Subdominant males guard the periphery. Only the alpha and an occasional close ally mate with females as they come into heat.

Perhaps the most interesting attempt at creating a more complex society is among our closest relatives, the chimpanzees. Chimps practice a polymorphous polygamy, where every female takes care to mate with every male. Sex takes place in public and is relatively noncompetitive. When a female comes into estrus, her bottom turns bright pink, advertising her receptivity. Males queue up according to status, but every male, no matter how low on the social ladder, is allowed to copulate.

This creates its own social harmony. For males, it reduces sexual rivalry. Within the «brotherhood» of the tribe, there is little overt sexual competition (although it persists in other subtle ways). As a result, male chimps cooperate in establishing territories to exclude other males and occasionally hunt smaller animals such as monkeys.

The system also creates an advantage for females. Within a polygamous social group, one of the greatest hazards to child-rearing is male jealousy. The male owner of a female harem constantly guards against the possibility that he is wasting energy protecting the offspring of other males. When a new male lion displaces the former owner of a pride, he immediately kills off all the young in order to set the females to work reproducing his own offspring. The heads of polygamous monkey clans do the same thing.

But with chimpanzees, things are different. By taking care to mate with every male, a female assures each male member of the troop that he might be the father of her offspring. By «confusing paternity,» females create a safe harbor for themselves, within which they are able to raise their offspring in relative tranquillity.

These techniques of unrestricted sexuality and indeterminate paternity have been tried from time to time in small human societies, notably among small religious and political sects. However, they have generally been a failure. The difficulty is that we have eaten too much of the tree of knowledge. We are too good at calculating which progeny are our own and which are not. (Child abuse and infanticide are most common when a man doubts his paternity.)

Rather than living in collective doubt, we have developed complex personalities that allow us to maintain private sexual relationships while sustaining a multilayered network of relatives, friends, acquaintances, associates, co-workers, and strangers with whom our interactions are mainly non-sexual. The result is the human society in which we all live.

The Price of Monogamy

HUMAN MONOGAMY thus holds out distinct advantages. Yet these advantages–as always-are bought at a price. Let us look at where the gains and forfeitures occur.

The winners under polygamy, you will recall, are high-status males and low-status females. Under monogamy, these parties lose their advantages, while compensating advantages are gained by high-status females and low-status males. High-status females no longer have to share their mates with low-status females, a particular advantage where long periods of child-rearing are involved. Low-status males, instead of being consigned to the bachelor herd, get a reasonable chance to a mate.

Perhaps we should pause here a moment to define what we mean by «high» and «low» status. High status usually has to do with desirable characteristics– beauty, strength, swiftness, bright feathers, or intelligence-whatever is admired by the species. In agencies where males fight for control of females (elk, lions, kangaroos), size and strength are usually the deciding factor. In species where females exercise some choice, physical beauty tends to play a greater role. As Darwin first noted, the bright plumage of the male bird is solely the result of generations of female selection.

In almost every species, youth is considered a desirable quality. In females, it implies a long, healthy life in which to raise offspring. In males, youth and vigor also suggest a wide variety of resources for child-rearing. Among the more social species, however, age, intelligence, and experience can play an important role. The alpha baboon is usually quite mature and sustains his access to females not through sheer strength or aggressiveness, but through the skillful formation of political alliances.

Under monogamy, another crucial characteristic is added–the willingness of the male to be a good provider. Yet this creates a dilemma for females. Unfortunately, the two favored characteristics–physical attractiveness and willingness to be a good provider–do not always come together. In fact, they often seem mutually exclusive. The peacock, the most beautiful of male birds, is notoriously a philanderer and a poor provider. With polygamy, females can ignore this problem and attach themselves to the most attractive males. With monogamy, however, females find themselves caught on the horns of the dilemma. Juggling these competing demands becomes a vexing responsibility–one that, at bottom, most females would ultimately like to escape.

Alternatives have always been available–at least covertly. In the 1950s, a research scientist began a routine experiment concerning natal blood type, trying to figure out which characteristics were dominant. To his astonishment, he found that 11 per cent of the babies born in American hospitals had blood types belonging to neither the mother nor the father–meaning the biological father was not the male listed on the birth certificate. The researcher was so dismayed by these findings that he suppressed them for over twenty years. Even at a time when monogamy was an unquestioned norm, at least 10 per cent of American women were resolving the female dilemma by tricking one man into providing for the child of another.

The Sources of Discontent

WITH ALL this in mind, then, let us look at where we should expect to find the major points of dissatisfaction with monogamy. First and foremost, monogamy limits the mating urges of high-status males. Everywhere in nature, males have an underlying urge to mate with as many females as possible. Studies among barnyard animals have shown that a male that has exhausted himself mating with one female will experience an immediate resurgence of sexual desire when a new female is introduced into his pen. (This is dubbed the «Coolidge effect,» after Calvin Coolidge, who once observed it while making a presidential tour of a barnyard.)

«Hogamous, higamous, men are polygamous. Higamous, hogamous, women monogamous,» wrote Ogden Nash, and the experience in all societies has been that the male urge to be polygamous is the weakest link in the monogamous chain. This has become particularly true in America’s mobile culture, where status-seeking males are often tempted to change wives as they move up the social ladder. «Serial monogamy» is. the name we have given it, but a better term might be «rotating polygamy. » A serious op-ed article in the New York Times a few years ago proposed that polygamy be legalized so that men could be compelled to support their earlier wives even as they move on to younger and more attractive women.

Marital infidelity, the lathering of illegitimate children, the pursuit of younger women, the «bimbo» and «trophy wife» syndromes–all are essential breaches of the monogamous social contract. When a Donald Trump deserts his wife and children for a woman almost twenty years his junior, he is obviously «wrecking a home» and violating monogamy’s implicit understanding that children should be supported until maturity. But he is doing something else as well. By mating with a much younger, second woman, he is also limiting the mating possibilities of younger men. One swallow does not make a summer, but repeated over and over, this pattern produces real demographic consequences. In societies that practice polygamy, competition over available females is always more intense.

The problems with male infidelity, then, are fairly clear. What is not always so obvious is that women’s commitment to monogamy is also somewhat circumscribed. The difficulties are two fold: 1) the general dissatisfaction of all women in being forced to choose between attractive males and good providers; and 2) the particular dissatisfaction among low-status women at being confined to the pool of low-status men.

In truth, low-status people of both sexes-or perhaps more significantly, people who are chronically dissatisfied with their status form a continuing challenge to any monogamous society. Unless there is an overwhelming cultural consensus that marriage and the joint raising of children forms the highest human happiness (which some people think it does), low-status males and females are likely to feel cheated by the relatively narrow pool of mates available to them. Their resentments and underlying desire to disrupt the rules of the game form a constant undercurrent of discontent in any monogamous society.

For males, one obvious way of by-passing the rules is rape. Although feminists, in their never-ending effort to repeal biology, have insisted that rape reflects some amorphous «hatred against women,» the more obvious interpretation is that it is a triumph of raw sexual desire over the more complex rules of social conduct. Rape overwhelmingly involves low-status men seeking sex with women who are otherwise inaccessible to them. (Rape is even more of a problem in polygamous societies, because of the more limited options for low-status males.) If «hatred» is involved, it is more likely to be general resentment of monogamy’s restrictions, which inaccessible, high-status women may come to represent. But this is all secondary. The basic crime of rape is the violation of a woman’s age-old biological right to choose her own sexual partners.

The other avenues for low-status males are prostitution and pornography. Each offers access to higher — status females, albeit under rather artificial circumstances. Individual females may benefit from pornography and prostitution in that they are paid (however poorly) for their participation. There is always a laissez-faire argument for allowing both. But when they become public and widespread, pornography and prostitution become another nagging reminder of the dissatisfactions some people will always feel with monogamy. In other words, they disrupt «family values.»

Female dissatisfaction with monogamy, on the other hand, is not always as obvious. Yet the restrictions put upon females–particularly low-status ones–will always be present and, in their own way, form their own undercurrent of discontent.

The principal female dissatisfaction is the dilemma of finding a mate who is both physically attractive and a good provider. As many and many a woman has discovered, it is much easier to get an attractive male into bed with you for the night than to keep him around in the morning.

The Murphy Brown Alternative

THERE IS, HOWEVER, a practical alternative. This is to return to the greater freedom of polygamy, where females can choose the most attractive males without regard to forming a permanent bond. This, of course, is the essence of «single motherhood.»

The rise of single motherhood is basically the expression of female discontent with monogamy. Rising female economic success makes it more practical (social scientists have long noted that marriage becomes more unstable as females become more economically independent). This undoubtedly accounts for the rising rate of divorce and single motherhood among affluent Americans.

But the emergence of almost universal single motherhood among the black underclass undercuts the purely economic argument (except, of course, to the degree that female independence has been subsidized by the welfare system). Black women are not opting for single motherhood because of rising economic success. What the availability of welfare does, however, is enable them to dispense with the courtship rituals of monogamy and choose the most desirable man available to them, regardless of the man’s willingness or ability to provide domestic support. It is this dynamic of liberated female sexual choice and not just the greater economic support offered by welfare that is driving black single motherhood today.

The essence of single motherhood, then, is status — jumping. By dispensing with the need to make a single choice, a woman can mate with a man who is far more desirable than any she could hope to retain under the artificial restraints of monogamy. The same dynamic is even more obvious among single mothers of the middle and upper classes. When asked to justify their choice, these women refer with surprising regularity to the unavailability of movie stars or other idealized males. («I know so many women who were waiting for that Alan Alda type to come along,» one unwed mother recently told Newsweek. «And they were waiting and waiting.») Yet when these women get themselves impregnated by otherwise unattainable men-or artificially inseminate themselves with accomplished doctors and lawyers, talented musicians, or Nobel Prize-winning scientists — what are they practicing but a contemporary form of high-tech polygamy?

The rebellion against monogamy, then, is being led by men dissatisfied because they cannot have more women and women dissatisfied with the choice of available men. (As an aging divorcee, Murphy Brown, despite her attractiveness, had a very limited pool of mating possibilities.) Yet each of these rebellions is driven by the most powerful human sexual dynamic–the desire of every living creature to produce offspring with the most desirable possible mating partners. Monogamy limits those desires.

The Homosexual Alternative

WHERE DOES homosexuality fit in all this? At its core, homosexuality is driven by a different dynamic. In every society, there is a small nucleus of men and women who feel uncomfortable with their sexual roles. For whatever reasons; biological, psychological, or a combination–they find it difficult or impossible to play the reproductive role dictated by their bodies and to mate with the opposite sex. This does not necessarily constitute a challenge to monogamy. Homosexuals and people with homosexual tendencies have often played important social roles. Priests, prophets, witch-doctors, artists, entertainers, cultural leaders–all have often been overtly or covertly homosexual or tinged with an undercurrent of ambiguous sexuality. All this forms no great social problem so long as homosexuality remains largely covert and marginal. The difficulty comes when it breaks out of the underground and becomes a mainstream alternative, particularly to the point of recruitment among the young. (Socrates, remember, was condemned to death for luring the youth of Athens into homosexuality.)

Once again, simple arithmetic begins to assert itself. When male homosexuality becomes widespread, it creates a dearth of eligible young men. This is particularly visible in urban environments. The growing population of male homosexuals in New York and other cities during the 1980s created the widely reported «man shortage» for young women. In the end, this large homosexual population seems to have induced an equally large lesbian population.

Are all these individuals really biologically determined to homosexuality? It seems doubtful. Rather, what seems to be happening is that homosexuality is becoming an acceptable form of protest for both men and women who do not like the choices offered to them by monogamy.

Once again, the problem is most pronounced with low-status people. For example, although there are undoubtedly some very attractive lesbian women, even a casual survey of the population reveals a very high incidence of members whose mating opportunities are obviously limited under monogamy. Moreover, the men who are available to them are themselves likely to be bitter and resentful over their choice of mates–in other words they «hate women.» One need only read the melancholy chronicle of Andrea Dworkin’s experiences with a string of sadistic, self-loathing men to realize why this woman has become one of the nation’s leading exponents of lesbianism. The professed ideology of both these groups is that they «hate» the other sex. Yet it would be much more correct to say that they hate the members of the opposite sex to which monogamy has confined them.

(I sometimes think the high point of America’s commitment to monogamy came around 1955, the year that Paddy Chayevsky’s low-budget Marty was a surprise box-office success and winner of the Academy Award. The story told of two plain people who, after numerous personal rejections, discover each other at a Saturday — night dance hall. The message of the movie, as articulated so often during that era, was that «For every girl there’s a boy and for every boy there’s a girl.»)

Despite its disruptive nature, homosexuality as a rebellion has little permanent impact until older biological urges begin to assert themselves and homosexuals want to have children. For men, there are few options. Apart from a few highly publicized cases, there are few homosexual men raising families. But for women, once again, we are back to single motherhood. Numerous lesbian couples are now having children, and lesbians have organized the most sophisticated sperm banks. How these children will react ten or fifteen years down the road to the realization that they are the children of anonymous sperm donors is anybody’s guess. But it seems likely they will have difficulty forming monogamous unions themselves and their resentments will only add to the sea of dissatisfactions.

Polygamy in Our Future?

TO SUM up, then, let us admit that no system of monogamy can ever bring complete happiness to everyone. Given the variability among individuals and given the universal desire to be paired with desirable mating partners, there will always be a sizable pool of dissatisfaction under monogamy. The real question is: How far can society allow this pool to grow before these private dissensions begin to rend the social fabric? In short, what can we expect society to look like if the monogamous ideal is abandoned?

It isn’t necessary to look very far. Western and Oriental cultures form a monogamous axis that spans the northern hemisphere (Orientals are far more monogamous than Westerners are), but a large part of the remaining world practices polygamy.

Polygamy is tolerated by the Koran–although it should be recognized that, like the principle of «an eye for an eye,» the Islamic law that allows a man four wives is a restriction from an earlier practice. The Koran requires that a man support all his wives equally, which generally confines the practice to wealthy males. In most Moslem countries, polygamous marriages are restricted to the upper classes and form no more than 4 to 5 per cent of all marriages.

In sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, polygamy is far closer to the norm. In parts of West Africa, more than 20 per cent of the marriages are polygamous. Marriage itself is rendered far more fragile by the practice of matrilinearity–tracing ancestry only through the mother’s line. In West Africa, a man may sire many children (Chief M.K.O. Abiola, of Nigeria’s Yoruba tribe, a self-made billionaire and chairman of ITT Nigeria, has 26 wives), but the paternal claim he can lay upon any of them. is far more tenuous than it would be in Oriental or Western societies. In West Africa, women can take their children and leave a marriage at any time, making the institution extremely unstable. In these tribal societies, Christianity and Islam which teach marital fidelity and permanent unions–are generally regarded as progressive social movements.

What qualities do we find in societies that tolerate polygamy? First, the shortage of women usually leads to the institution of the «bride price,» where a young man must pay a sizable sum of money to the bride’s family in order to obtain a wife. (The «dowry,» in which a sum is attached to an eligible daughter to make her more attractive, is purely a product of monogamy.) This makes wives difficult to obtain for men who come from less well-to-do families.

The numerical imbalance between eligible males and females also forces older men to court younger women. Girls in their teens are often betrothed to men ten and fifteen years their senior. In some South Seas societies, infant females are betrothed to grown men. These strained couplings make marriage itself a distant and unrewarding relationship, far different from the «peer marriages» of Western and Oriental cultures.

Finally, polygamy tends to produce a high level of male violence. Because low-status males are not assured any reasonable chance of mating by the social contract, they are essentially impossible to incorporate into the larger work of society. Instead, they form themselves into violent gangs or become the foot soldiers of extremist political groups. In Pakistan, the recent news has been that the country is being overrun by these violent gangs, which have become the competing «parties» in the country’s turbulent political system. The head of one of these factions was recently accused of raping dozens of airline stewardesses.

Yet even where polygamy is openly sanctioned, childrearing is always built around the formation of husband-and-wife households–even if these households may contain several wives. Only among the American underclass has polygamy degenerated into a purely polymorphous variety, where courtship is forgone and family formation has become a virtually forgotten ritual.

In a recent issue of The Public Interest, Elijah Anderson, professor of social science at the University of Pennsylvania, described an on-going acquaintance with a 21-year-old black youth whom he called «John Turner.» Anderson described the social milieu of Turner’s neighborhood as follows:

In Philadelphia, . . the young men of many individual streets organize informally bounded areas into territories. They then guard the territories, defending them against the intrusions and whims of outsiders …

Local male groups claim responsibility over the women in the area, especially if they are young. These women are seen as their possessions, at times to be argued over and even fought over. When a young man from outside the neighborhood attempts to «go with» or date a young woman from the neighborhood, he must usually answer to the boys’ group, negotiating for their permission first…

At twenty-one years of age, John was the father of four children out of wedlock. He had two sons who were born a few months apart by different women, one daughter by the mother of one of the sons, and another son by a third woman.

This mating pattern is not uncommon in nature. It has recently been observed in dolphins and of course bears a strong resemblance to the structure of some primate tribes. Yet what works for these species is no longer plausible for human beings. Once again, we have eaten from the tree of knowledge. We have too much intimate knowledge of the details of sexual connection and paternity to be satisfied with this vague collectivism.

Thus «John Turner» explains how his efforts to put some order into his life by creating a bond between two of his sons resulted in his being jailed for assault: Well, see, this girl, the girl who’s the mother of my one son, Teddy. See, I drove my girlfriend’s car by her house with my other son with me. I parked the car down the street from her house and everything. So I took John, Jr., up to the house to see his brother, and we talk for awhile. But when I get ready to leave, she and her girlfriend followed me to the car. I got in the car and put John in. Then she threw a brick through the window.

The unavoidable consequence of polymorphous polygamy among humans is a tangle of competing jealousies and conflicting loyalties that make ordinary life all but impossible. The central institution at the axis of human society–the nuclear family–no longer exists.

Unfortunately, while such a mating system virtually guarantees child abuse (usually involving a «boyfriend»), internal turmoil, and rampant violence, it is also extremely reproductive. While their social life has degenerated into extreme chaos, the American underclass are nonetheless reproducing faster than any other population in the world. This follows a well-known biological principle that when populations come under stress, they attempt to save themselves by reproducing faster, with sexual maturity usually accelerated to a younger age.

The culture of polygamy is also self-reinforcing and self-perpetuating. If men feel there is nothing more to fatherhood than «making babies,» then women will feel free to seek the most attractive men, without making any effort to bind them to the tasks of child-rearing. As a cultural pair, the footloose male and the single mother, if not held back by the force of social convention, can easily become the predominant type. The result is a free-for-all in which human society as we know it may become very difficult, if not impossible.

Back to ‘Family Values’

THIS, THEN, is the essence of «family values.» Family values are basically the belief that monogamy is the most peaceful and progressive way of organizing a human society. Dislike and distaste for anything that challenges the monogamous contract easy divorce, widespread pornography, legalized prostitution, out-of-wedlock child bearing, blatant homosexuality-are not just narrow or prudish concerns. They come from an intelligent recognition that the monogamous contract is a fragile institution that can easily unravel if dissaffections become too widespread.

What is likely to happen if we abandon these values? People will go on reproducing, you can be sure of that. But families won’t be formed («litters» might be a more appropriate term). And the human beings that are produced in these litters will not be quite the same either. If marriage is a compromise between men and women, then the breakdown of monogamy can only let loose the natural egocentrisms of both.

It is probably not too alarmist to note that societies that have been unable to establish monogamy have also been unable to create working democracies or widely distributed wealth. No society that domesticates too few men can have a stable social order. People who are incapable of monogamy are probably incapable of many other things as well.

As a basically limiting human compact, monogamous marriage is bound to produce its peculiar difficulties. As with any compromise, each individual can argue based on present or previous deprivation, real or imagined-that he or she should not be bound by the rules.

Yet it should also be clear that, beyond the personal dissatisfactions we all may feel, each of us also retains a permanent, private stake in sustaining a system that creates a peaceful social order and offers to everyone a reasonable chance of achieving personal happiness. If monogamy makes complex demands on human beings, it also offers unique and complex rewards.

The Three Powers (don’t forget the comments)

Taken from https://web.archive.org/save/https://orthosphere.wordpress.com/2019/06/20/the-three-powers/

“All divines grant that the power of the Church is more noble than any power of princes or emperors.”

Matthew Kellison, The Right and Jurisdiction of the Prelate and the Prince (1621)

“There has been great controversy concerning the power of bishops, in which some have awkwardly confounded the power of the Church and the power of the Sword.”

Augsburg Confession (1530)

“The Government has been legislated into the hands of bankers and brokers, and reduced to a dependence on corporations.” 

Lewis Steenrod, Speech in the House of Representatives (April 17, 1840)

The first step in political understanding is to see that every society has a ruling class, and that the myth of popular government is an opiate of the masses.  If you need help taking this step, I suggest you consult Main’s Popular Government (1886) or Burnham’s Machiavellians (1943).

The Emperor, James Carroll Beckwith (c. 1890)

The second step is to see that the ruling class has three departments, one controlling the spiritual power of the church, one controlling the military power of the state, and one controlling the productive power of the economy.  In India, these were historically called the Brahmans, the Kshatriyas, and the Vaisyas.  In the West, they were called the nobles, the clergy, and the bourgeoise.

The masses ruled by these three classes were in India called the Sudras, and were in the West called peasants, peons, or the working class.  These are the people the Brahman’s teach, the Kshatriyas command, and the Vaisyas employ, and who from time to time get it into their heads to try teaching, commanding, and employing themselves.  When this happens, they mount a slave revolt or peasants’ rebellion under the banner of some sort of communism.  This leads to anarchy and famine, and this to a reconstituted ruling class.

Or ruling classes, since the princes of church, state and commerce may act in combination, but they are never altogether consolidated or unified.  Each class is always struggling for supremacy (if we give that word its true meaning).  When the nobles enjoy supremacy, we call the polity an aristocracy.  When the clergy enjoys supremacy, we call it a theocracy.  When the bourgeoisie enjoy supremacy, we call it a plutocracy.

In the West, these three powers were often described as the Power of the Sword, the Power of the Keys, and the Power of the Purse.

Westminster, London, George Hyde Pownall (c. 1900)

You may picture this political arrangement if you imagine a set of chessmen.  In the first row stand the pawns, numerous but negligible, representing the peasant masses.  Behind them stand the powers.  At the outer edge stands the rook, which I take the liberty to interpret, not as a nobleman’s castle, but as the fortified town of the merchant princes or bourgeoisie. Next in from the rook is the knight, obviously representing the military power.  Next in from the knight is the bishop, just as obviously representing the ecclesiastical power.  And at the center are the king and his consort, his power limited to authorizing the actions of the other powers on which his own survival depends.  He cannot stand without the others, but when he falls, the others fall with him.  (The curious and deadly power of the queen deserves its own post.)

The regnant ruling classes often fortify their power by spreading fear of their predecessors in power. This is obvious today in the fear-mongering of our regnant clergy, who routinely scare the peasants by raising an alarm that the relic clergy of the deposed church is plotting a renewed “theocracy.” There are few things more mordantly funny than reading some high-class academic, journalist, or judge, warning against the “theocratic” ambitions of the nominal “bishops,” “priests” and “preachers” who staff the toothless hierarchies of our quondam churches.

Three Clerical Scholars, Thomas Rowlandson (c. 1789)

Like their predecessors, today’s ruling classes are hierarchical, and their lower ranks merge without strong division with the peasants or working class.  Just as a lowly curate was closer to the peasants than to the cardinals of the Church, so today’s lowly academic, journalist or judge is closer to the working class than to the Brahmans of the regnant priestly order. The owner of a small business is, likewise, closer to the workers than to the true merchant princes, and the same goes for petty officers at the base of the state apparatus.

As I said a moment ago, these three classes are rivals for supremacy, and when one usurps the supreme power and exercises control over the other two, we call it a revolution.  At the turn of the eighteenth century, for instance, bourgeois revolutions established what we call “industrial society.” It is a mistake to see industrial society and the industrial revolution as simply a matter of vast machines and smoky factory-towns, since these were mere symptoms of a society in which bourgeois values (i.e. productive values) were dominant or supreme.

A society is “industrial” when the officers of the state and church feel obliged to do what is “good for the economy.”  It is “militaristic” when moneymen and priests answer to the man who holds the sword. It is religious when, at the behest of the priests, the knights who hold the sword ride away on crusades, and the burgers who hold the purse build great cathedrals to the sky.

Reading the Newspaper, Jules Chéret (c. 1890)

We all know that kings were traditionally crowned by the head of the church.  Charlemagne was, for instance, crowned by the Pope, and British monarchs have long been crowned by the Archbishop of Canterbury.  In the modern United States, we call the coronation an inauguration, and the “crown” is bestowed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  From this we may draw the inference that he is roughly equivalent to our archbishop or pope.  This we may also infer from his strangely sacerdotal garb, and from his prerogative to interpret our sacred text, the Constitution, in ways few Sudras can comprehend.

Just as Popes never had the autocratic power of Protestant nightmares, so the Chief Justice is constrained by the tradition and hierarchy of his church.  In recent years, it has become common to call this church “the Cathedral,” and to see that it takes in the judiciary, the academy, and most of the media complex.  This Cathedral now holds the Power of the Keys, which are no longer the Keys to Heaven, but are the Keys to social respectability and self-respect.  It does not use the word excommunication, but it has fearsome powers of ostracism, public-shaming and harassment that amount to much the same thing.

As a geographer, I am naturally interested in the capitals, or head cities, in which these ruling classes work and reside.  Many countries have a single metropolis in which the heads of all three powers are collected.  London and Paris are, for instance, the unified political, cultural and economic capitals of the British and the French.  Separate capitals are not uncommon, however.  A thousand years ago, the economic capital of England was in London, but the political capital was in Winchester and the cultural capital was at Canterbury.

In the United States, the political capitals of the states are very often separated from the economic capitals, and this separation was reproduced when the federal government became a real force after adoption of the Constitution.  Since 1800, Washington has been the seat of military and political power, while New York has controlled the ultimate Power of the Purse.  The economic primacy of New York has many sources, some of which are profoundly geographical, but much can be made of the fact that its first name was New Amsterdam and the Dutch Republic was very close to a pure plutocracy (1).

Hudson River Waterfront, Colin Campbell Cooper (1904)

As there was no established church hierarchy, there was no obvious seat of ecclesiastical power, and, in the early years of the Republic, almost all secular culture was imported from London, Paris, and the German universities.  By the 1840s, however, Boston had clearly emerged as the center of American literary culture, and as the capital of the American civic religion.  The Power of the Keys to social respectability lay largely in the hands of a class known even then as the “Boston Brahmins.”  Yankee schoolmasters, preachers and college presidents spread out from Boston to every corner of the land, bringing with them such Yankee notions as transcendentalism, feminism, spiritualism, abolitionism, and even, in some cases, vegetarianism.  Ichabod Crane was a well-recognized type, and he was not in real life chased back to New England by a terrifying headless horseman.

Teacher with Pupil, A. B. Frost (c. 1900)

By the turn of the nineteenth century, the money power of New York had begun to draw in some of the cultural power of Boston, although Washington remained (as it largely remains) the primate city of philistines.  Railroads and the telegraph had also shrunk the distance between Washington and New York, so the three cities functioned as the principal nodes in the metropolitan district of the American empire (2).  The size and complexity of the country required satraps in the provinces, but the Powers of the Sword, the Keys, and the Purse remained fixed on the Atlantic seaboard.

California has been the only serious challenger to this metropolitan dominance, with a large colony of Brahmins clustering around the entertainment industries of the Los Angles’ basin, and a very fair showing of moneymen in the Bay area.  The migration of power to the west coast is also encouraged by the declining importance of Europe and the rise of Asia, since a country’s seats of power normally locate directly behind its frontier with its most powerful neighbor.  This may be to facilitate military operations, economic trade, or cultural exchange, so all three powers are attracted to this type of “forward capital” (3).  The powers in California are today sufficient to defy the powers on the Atlantic seaboard, but they do not appear capable of asserting supremacy over them.

The universities are the natural home of the clergy, and anyone not stupefied by propaganda can see that they are our established church.  Moneymen still exercise  influence over some parts of the curriculum, but universities are staffed by Brahmins and their principal power is the Power of the Keys. Not the Keys to Heaven, as I said earlier, but the Keys to respectability and polite society.  In the last analysis, a politically correct university is a convent finishing school for genteel girls of both sexes.  Because Harvard is the most prestigious of these convent finishing schools, Boston remains the cultural capital of the United States.

A Man Driving a Team of Six Girls, Thomas Rowlandson (c. 1779)

Which of the three powers is now supreme?  Is it the power of the Sword, the power of the Keys, or the power of the Purse?  It seems to me obvious that the Sword is weakest since the Commander in Chief (and not just the present one) takes orders from the moneymen and is threatened with impeachment when he doesn’t take orders from the Brahmins.  As to the relative strength of the Keys and the Purse, this can be judged from the fact that much of the university curriculum is anti-capitalist, but capitalists still give money to the universities.  Thus, we must concede supremacy to the power of the Keys and say we inhabit a theocracy.

 

(1) “From the beginning [the Dutch] have been ruled by merchants and business men, rather than by kings and princes . . .” (William Yoast Morgan, A Jayhawker in Europe [1912]).

(2) Vaughan Cornish, The Great Capitals: An Historical Geography (1923).

(3) ibid.

9 thoughts on “The Three Powers”

  1. Pingback: The Three Powers | Reaction Times
  2. Great article, sir! You wrote:

     The Power of the Keys to social respectability lay largely in the hands of a class known even then as the “Boston Brahmins.”  Yankee schoolmasters, preachers and college presidents spread out from Boston to every corner of the land, bringing with them such Yankee notions as transcendentalism, feminism, spiritualism, abolitionism, and even, in some cases, vegetarianism. Ichabod Crane was a well-recognized type, and he was not in real life chased back to New England by a terrifying headless horseman.

    To prove these assertions, let facts be submitted to a candid readership:

    https://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/moajrnl/acf2679.0014.010/601:7?page=root;rgn=full+text;size=100;view=image;q1=Horace+Mann

    • Thanks, Terry. It’s good to hear from you. These advocates presented the largely false idea that the nation’s children were mostly uneducated, and on a cursory reading seemed merely to advocate universal education. But the reality was that most children already received an education and their moral formation was left to the churches and their parents. The real proposal from these writers was that there be compulsory government education with themselves in charge. As with most things, I think this should have been left to the states, so that Massachusetts had common schools and Alabama did not. It will be said that Massachusetts spread its doctrines by persuasion, in articles such as this one, but the tide of persuasion and propaganda seems to have run in one way only. Alabama seems never to have lectured Massachusetts on the evils of common schools.

      • Alabama seems never to have lectured Massachusetts on the evils of common schools.

        No. And I should imagine that is because, by contrast to the meddling Yankee, Southerners have always been more inclined to “live and let live.”

        As you know, R.L. Dabney wrote numerous scathing articles on the evils of common schools, predicting with a high degree of accuracy what their establishment in the South portended for the future of the Southern States. But of course this was in reaction to their forcible establishment in the southern states during “Reconstruction”; he didn’t presume to lecture them on those evils we see in full relief today until after the the Yankee system was imposed on the South against her will and contrary to her immediate and long term interests. Speaking of which, had the meddling Yankee spread his doctrines by persuasion, as opposed to by force, Dabney and others would have had no cause to expose in such articles the palpable defects of the Yankee system, and the imbecility of its advocates making wild predictions (as in the article I linked to above) that under such a system 99 out of 100 students enrolled would thereby become wonderful parents and model citizens, etc. It’s hard for me to wrap my mind around the idea that any intelligent Southerner at the time bought into such abject nonsense in the face of mountains of evidence to the contrary. But I should also keep in mind that the Yankee common schools were ultimately imposed on the South and her wiser heads by her conquerors; it isn’t something the South engaged voluntarily or of her own free will.

        I agree with everything you wrote above.

  3. I presently have a student working on a Master’s degree and following my suggestion to study the school system of Brazos county in the 1920’s and 30’s. It was a public system by that time, and certainly was not lavish, but he found (as I suspected he would) that every child in the county, black or white, had a schoolhouse less than two miles from home. Truancy was not punished in the rural areas, and students began dropping out around age 12, but every child had access to education. This student, a school teacher by profession, was at first amazed to discover that there were black schools, and not only a few. One interesting aspect of this is that these rural parents had a very sane and sober appreciation of the dangers of over-education. I may write a post on this. Most people today think there is no such thing as too much education, whereas history teaches us that over-education leads to personal unhappiness and social unrest. There were smart farm boys who would have been wasted had they stayed “down on the farm,” but fathers understood the folly of raising frustrated future farmers with a taste for book learning.

    The optimism of the article you link is striking, but it reflects educated opinion in the early 19th century. People had complete confidence that men and women could be made into near angels if only they were raised in the right environment. Obviously, there are benefits to a good environment, but these do not change the nature of the species or the individual.

  4. > The universities are the natural home of the clergy, and anyone not stupefied by propaganda can see that they are our established church.

    They are certainly part of it, but I’m not convinced that they are the real ideological power. I suspect Harvard has more reason to fear the displeasure of the New York Times than the New York Times has reason to fear the displeasure of Harvard. Certainly university administrators live in terror of reporters, and teachers are increasingly intimidated by their media-brainwashed students.

    It’s true that the terrible ideas that oppress us today all come with the names of academics attached, but that would be true whether the universities are imposing their ideas or if they are only generating ideas from which their true masters pick which are to be imposed. As an analogy, theologians are the ones who come up with new theological ideas, but the pope decides which ones are enforced. Who is our pope?

    It’s also true that reporters go through journalism programs at the universities, but I am skeptical of the claim that universities are radicalizing anybody. The freshmen come in as raving fanatics thanks to the press and entertainment industry, and they drive the university further Left than even it would like to go.

    We would have to see what happens should the arms of the established church ever disagree to know for sure who is master.

  5. I don’t disagree with anything you say. I see this in Darwinian terms, and so suppose that the present church evolved to survive within the environment of selective pressures that crippled the old Church. Even when criticism cannot overthrow explicit dogma and doctrine, it can spread a general skepticism, so the doctrine of the new church is fluid and its dogmas are very seldom clearly stated. Christian clerics are forced to defend passages in a single book that is readily accessible and cannot be disowned. The doctrines and dogmas of the new church are spread out across a large and ill-defined “literature,” any single work in which can be abandoned without yielding much real ground. Thus the old Church was somewhat like a fortress that would fall if its massive walls were breached, but the new church is like a guerrilla army that can lose innumerable skirmishes and yet still control the jungle. As innumerable Orthosphere debates with Winston Scrooge have shown, “liberalism” has a way of slipping through the fingers of anyone who thinks they have finally laid hold of it.

    The absence of a clear hierarchy is also an adaptation because there are no clear targets and it permits endless use of the “no true Scotsman” defense. As you have often pointed out at T&A, the clerical abuse scandal is a coherent phenomenon because all the misbehaving clerics are employed by the same institution. The clerics of the new church are distributed throughout many seemingly unrelated institutions, so a misbehaving professor is not an obvious discredit to journalists and and judges of the same kidney. These people are “planted” in multiple institutions, rather like the old communist sleeper cells, and their actions are coordinated without any explicit chain of command.

    As I said, I think the structure of the new church is evolved, not planned. The people of the West have been on the lookout for an authoritarian church since the time of the Protestant Reformation, so the church that actually exists is not easily recognizable as a church. Thus it has no Pope, no hierarchy, no Bible, and no explicit rites of worship and initiation. But as you say, it does have fanatical believers who must have somehow been catechized.

    A big part of the selective pressure is found in the supposedly secular school system, since this kills off doctrines that it recognizes as religious, but allows others to survive and be taught to all children at pubic expense. Feminism is a clear example of a new religion that can get past the antibodies of the secular university. There is no she-pope of feminism, no feminist Koran, and no feminist rites of worship, but it is in all other respects an intolerant and sectarian religion that should be confined to private seminaries. The spirit of feminism is clearly religious, but it has shed the forms of the older regions in order to survive in what are ostensibly secular institutions.

    • > …the supposedly secular school system, since this kills off doctrines that it recognizes as religious, but allows others to survive and be taught to all children at pubic expense. Feminism is a clear example…

      Very good point. It’s remarkable how the Left is able to have its doctrines declared noncontroversial and settled. The idea that government should be neutral between feminism and patriarchy and that kids should be free to develop their own opinions on this is unheard of. Similarly for attitudes toward blacks and Jews.

      I am admittedly not neutral on the question of where the center of evil is. I have a great deal of affection for the university system, and I openly support covering up the misdeeds of institutions I like. However, my impression really is of wider social forces driving the university rather than vice versa. Probably you would say where I go wrong is in thinking that there must therefore be some other sector of society which is not being driven, but is doing the driving. For example, I imagine editorialists for the New York Times feeling no particular pressure to push society even further Left, but deciding to do so on their own initiative. But that supposition may be false. The car that we’re on doesn’t need a driver.

  6. Agree with your supposition that the NYT is more influential than Harvard and is the foremost driver of the Cathedral.
    What’s the scheme again? Academia explores where the Left will go in the future, news media determines where it goes now, and entertainment media drags along the slower-on-the-uptake?
    But, despite the NYT being the most important engine on the crazy train, I don’t think it has the power to bring the whole thing to a halt. If the editorial board woke up one day and decided to make it a centrist paper, it seems likely that the Left would just rally around the Washington Post, CNN, or whatever in its place.
    The ultimate driver of the Left is the spirit beneath it.

1912 Steiner lecture about the sexual revolution

Excerpts from a lecture by Rudolf Steiner, which took place on 9th October, 1918 in Zurich. Translated into English by D. S. Osmond with the help of Owen Barfield. Taken from https://web.archive.org/save/https://www.francisberger.com/bergers-blog/endorsing-promoting-and-embracing-sexual-perversion-has-become-a-moral-imperative

Certain instinctive knowledge will arise in human nature connected with the mystery of birth and conception, with sexual life as a whole; and this threatens to become baleful if the danger of which I have spoken takes effect. 

The effect in the evolution of humanity would be that certain instincts connected with the sexual life would arise in a pernicious form instead of wholesomely, in clear waking consciousness. 

These sexual instincts would not be mere aberrations, but would pass over into and configure the social life, would above all prevent men from unfolding brotherhood in any form whatever on the earth, and would rather induce them to rebel against it. This would be a matter of instinct. 

So the crucial point lies ahead when either the path to the right can be taken — but that demands wakefulness — or the path to the left, which permits of sleep. But in that case instincts come on the scene — instincts of a fearful kind. 

And what do you suppose the scientific experts will say when such instincts come into evidence? They will say that it is a natural and inevitable development in the evolution of humanity. But light cannot be shed on such matters by natural science, for whether men become angels or devils would be equally capable of explanation by scientific reasoning. Science will say the same in both cases: the later is the outcome of the earlier …

Natural science will be totally blind to the event of which I have told you, for if men become half devils through their sexual instincts, science will as a matter of course regard this as a natural necessity. Scientifically, then, the matter is simply not capable of explanation, for whatever happens, everything can be explained by science. 

Man would pride himself upon the growth of his instinctive knowledge of certain processes and substances and would experience such satisfaction in obeying certain aberrations of the sexual impulses that he would regard them as evidence of a particularly high development of superhumanity, of freedom from convention, of broad-mindedness! 

In a certain respect, ugliness would be beauty and beauty, ugliness

Yet, nothing of this would be perceived because it would all be regarded as natural necessity. But it would actually denote an aberration from the path which, in the nature of humanity itself, is prescribed for man’s essential being. 

Sobre la estafa de la libertad en la transición

De acuerdo con Senenmut. Nos engañaron. Todas esas cancioncitas de «Libertad, libertad, sin ira ,libertad». Todo aquello de «se acabó el franquismo y ahora vais a ser libres, de Franco, de la Iglesia, de todo». Era sólo el pretexto para agarrar el poder.

Una vez afianzaron el poder, la única libertad que tenemos es votar cada cuatro años a unos partidos que hacen todos lo mismo. El PSOE hace política capitalista y el PP hace política de género. Las políticas se deciden fuera de España, en élites globalistas y gane quien gane, las aplica. Nos hacen votar para que no vean que somos esclavos.

Para lo otro, millones de reglas que te dicen como vivir, como hablar, como pensar, como cantar. Ya entrañables canciones como las de Miliki o «Corazón de tiza» serían impensables. No hay espacio para la ironía, para el arte, para la interpretación. La nueva inquisición está alerta a que todos pensemos igual y hablemos igual, según la religión desquiciada y fantasiosa de lo políticamente correcto. Salte de la ortodoxia aunque sea un milímetro y te tirarán del trabajo o te convertirás en un paria social. Al lado de esto, el régimen de Franco fue un remanso de libertad. Lectura recomendada:

https://www.elmundo.es/opinion/2015/11/22/5650b98c22601d2a688b462a.html

About the Romantic Christianity and liberalism

I think your theory of Romantic Christianity is flawed.

According this theory, during the Enlightenment, mankind was at the verge of a «great leap forward»: an awareness of conscience. Traditional Christianity (with its blind adherence to rules and churches) was going to be replaced by Romantic Christianity (with the individual adherence to the Good and its expansion of conscience).

Then people refused this change and used their individualism to follow evil. Not only during the Enlightenment but for the last three centuries. Not only collectively, but individually, billions and billions of people. Not only once, but billions of times.

The problem is not about Romantic Christianity. The problem is about billions and billions of people that don’t use it well billions of times.

Now, in the previous paragraphs (from «According to this theory» on), replace «Romantic Christianity» with «liberalism» and you will be one of the propagandists of the current system. It is not that liberalism produces evil, it is only that people don’t do liberalism well.

Being human beings broken and imperfect (original sin), a system that only works when operated by angelic beings is a lousy system. John Adams said: «Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate to the government of any other». This is like saying «Our hospital is only for healthy people. It is wholly inadequate to the healing of any other».

For a moral and religious people, any Constitution and any government is good. The goal of government regulations (such as the Constitution) is to handle the cases where people are not moral and religious (the role of the law is to handle the cases that the conscience and social pressure have not handled well, see my previous comment).

This does not mean that Romantic Christianity never works. It works in isolated cases, such as brainy types like you. But evidence shows that does not work as a basis of a society because the vast majority of people reject it. No «great leap forward» was going to follow the Enlightenment. It was only the freeing of the selfish impulses that have been previously repressed. This had to be sugarcoated in some way so it was sold as an awakening of conscience, like the hippies telling they were entering the age of Aquarius while having sex and drugs.

The utopist is big in you. I think it is a case of lingering liberalism (which all modern Christian people have, including myself). But it is easier to see it from the outside.

I don’t think you will agree with me. I have only written this comment for other people to read. If you don’t think it is worthwhile, feel free to delete it.

Since I plan to keep on reading you and keep on learning from you (and I occasionally feel the urge to leave a comment), please have you the last word on this topic.

«Los chalecos amarillos estarán ahí durante 100 años. Van a llegar a España»

«Los chalecos amarillos estarán ahí durante 100 años. Van a llegar a España»

El geógrafo Christophe Guilluy acaba de publicar ‘No Society. El fin de la clase media occidental’. Sus tesis anticiparon los grandes movimientos sociales contemporáneos

Sacado: https://www.elconfidencial.com/alma-corazon-vida/2019-06-19/chalecos-amarillos-torquemada-medios-partidos_2079688/

Foto: Christophe Guilluy.

Geógrafo de profesión, Christophe Guilluy es un heterodoxo que ha pagado un precio importante por el pecado de pensar fuera de las líneas ideológicas dominantes. Se hizo famoso en su país con su libro ‘La Francia periférica’, al que sucedió ‘Le crépuscule de la France d’en haut’ (‘El crepúsculo de la Francia de arriba’), y con ‘No Society. El fin de la clase media occidental’ (Ed. Taurus), sus tesis han cobrado nueva fuerza. Guilluy anticipó el fenómeno de los chalecos amarillos, así como la recomposición social y política que se está fraguando en nuestras sociedades.

PREGUNTA. Entendemos que la clase media está formada por personas con cierto nivel de renta o por profesionales y cuadros intermedios. Usted señala que el concepto de clase media es también cultural, que designa a personas que forman parte de un conjunto aunque entre ellas existan desigualdades salariales. ¿Quién es clase media hoy? ¿Quiénes forman parte de ella?

RESPUESTA. No, no se trata solo de cuadros intermedios. El concepto de clase media es social y cultural,y describe a una clase mayoritaria e integrada. Hasta la década de 1980, la mayoría de los empleados (trabajadores, profesiones intermedias, gerentes) estaban integrados económica, social y culturalmente. Todas estas categorías tenían la sensación de pertenecer a la clase media, que era mayoritaria porque nos encontrábamos en un proceso de ascenso social. Todo cambió con la aparición del modelo económico globalizado y la división internacional del trabajo, que conllevó una desindustrialización masiva y la precarización de algunos puestos de trabajo. Desde entonces, hemos sido testigos de un lento proceso de salida de la clase media de aquellas categorías sociales que ya no están integradas en el modelo económico.

Comenzó con los obreros, siguió después con los campesinos que perdieron sus empleos con la desindustrialización y continuó con los empleados y los cuadros intermedios de algunos sectores profesionales. Este desarrollo está vinculado a la polarización del empleo, y por un lado tenemos grupos profesionales bien retribuidos y por otro empleos precarios y mal remunerados. Es constatable que la mayoría de las categorías sociales que ayer fueron la base de la clase media se han fragilizado. Ya no están económicamente integradas y se sienten relegadas culturalmente. Por eso estoy hablando de la desaparición de la mayoría de la clase media.

P. Asegura que la socialdemocracia tuvo muchos problemas a la hora de hablar de lucha de clases y que esas mismas reticencias aparecen alrededor del concepto ‘Francia periférica’, que usted popularizó. ¿De qué hablamos cuando hablamos de las periferias?

R. Desde la década de 1980, el Partido Socialista abandonó la cuestión social al adoptar el modelo neoliberal. Este cambio contribuye al abandono de la clase obrera y de las clases populares. Al mismo tiempo, el electorado de la izquierda se aburguesó y gentrificó, y se reunió alrededor de las grandes ciudades. En Francia, el giro a la izquierda de París en 2001 supuso el divorcio definitivo del partido socialista con las clases populares. La izquierda ganó París y perdió a la gente.

La izquierda consideraba que las clases populares eran respetables y hasta gloriosas, y hoy las consideran deplorables o fascistas

El concepto de ‘Francia periférica’ trata de hacer visible la Francia olvidada, la de las categorías populares que ya no viven en metrópolis sino en las ciudades medianas y pequeñas y en las zonas rurales. Estos territorios representan el 60% de la población. La ‘Francia periférica ‘hace visible el conflicto de clases del siglo XXI que opone las periferias populares a las metrópolis gentrificadas. Esta geografía es la consecuencia de la concentración de la riqueza y del empleo en esas villas globales, lo que causa la desertificación del empleo en las periferias.

En Europa, como en los Estados Unidos, la izquierda está ahora prisionera de su electorado, se ha encerrado en las grandes metrópolis y ya no puede hablar con la clase obrera (el fracaso de Podemos es la consecuencia de su confinamiento en Barcelona o Madrid). Pero más importante que todo esto, es que la ruptura con las clases populares es sobre todo cultural. En el pasado, la izquierda consideraba que las clases populares eran respetables y hasta gloriosas, y hoy las consideran deplorables o fascistas.

P. A pesar de que no tienen conciencia de clase, afirma en ‘No Society’, estas capas populares comparten una percepción común de los efectos que les ha causado la globalización. Esta reestructuración social no ha reactivado la lucha de clases, pero sí está causando cambios. ¿Cuáles son estos efectos?

R. En el conjunto de los países occidentales, estamos asistiendo a una recomposición social de las clases trabajadoras. Estas categorías no tienen conciencia de clase, pero comparten una percepción común de los efectos de la globalización. Hoy en día, los trabajadores (que antes votaban a la izquierda), los campesinos (que antes votaban a la derecha) o los empleados comparten la misma precariedad social y la misma relegación geográfica y cultural. Por primera vez en la historia, las clases trabajadoras ya no viven donde se crean la riqueza y el empleo. Esta situación conlleva una importante recomposición política y cultural en el seno de las clases populares, que han tomado conciencia de ser las perdedoras del modelo económico globalizado.

P. Ha calificado el triunfo electoral de Macron como una victoria pírrica, en parte porque lo contrapone al éxito de Trump. El primero sería fruto de una alianza de minorías y el segundo apuntaría a una clase mayoritaria.

R. Trump se dirige a un electorado que constituye una mayoría, ciertamente relativa, pero que posee continuidad sociocultural: es la vieja clase media de la América periférica. Se trata de un electorado cuya demanda se expresa claramente: la mayoría de estos votantes están demandando empleos pero también la conservación de su modelo social y cultural. A la inversa, el problema de Macron es la fragilidad y heterogeneidad de su electorado. Al contrario de lo que suele decirse, el presidente francés no solo fue votado por los ganadores de las grandes metrópolis sino también por un electorado mayor que hoy se precariza y que comienza a participar en movimientos de contestación (muchos chalecos amarillos son jubilados).

Este ‘bloque burgués’, ecologista y liberal, es una consecuencia mecánica y natural de la nueva organización económica y geográfica

Y por encima de todo, la geografía electoral Macron descansa sobre ciudadelas (las grandes ciudades) que son estructuralmente minoritarias, que le sostuvieron a causa de que el ‘bloque popular’ está dividido, pero que son en realidad son muy frágiles.

P. ¿Qué piensa de la alianza entre los partidos socialistas europeos, Macron y Alde y los Verdes? ¿Cuál es el futuro de esta alianza?

R. Sí, esta alianza es coherente porque estos partidos cubren la misma sociología y la misma geografía, la de las metrópolis globalizadas. La constitución de este ‘bloque burgués’, ecologista y liberal, es una consecuencia mecánica y natural de la nueva organización económica y geográfica. Al mismo tiempo, estamos presenciando en la Francia periférica la constitución de un ‘bloque popular’ que aún no ha encontrado un representante político unificador.

P. Insiste en algo bastante obvio, y que Christopher Lasch definió como la ‘rebelión de las élites’. Afirma que es una “élite sin moral”, ya que ha provocado que desaparezcan los valores mayoritarios y el proyecto de una vida en común.

R. A fines de la década de 1980, el historiador estadounidense Christopher Lasch habló de la secesión de las élites. Hoy el proceso ha llegado mucho más lejos, conformando unas clases altas que han generado una ruptura cultural y geográfica con las clases trabajadoras.

El problema es que no se puede hacer sociedad excluyendo a las clases populares mayoritarias. Este modelo no es duradero

Hoy en día, las capas superiores se repliegan en metrópolis que se parecen cada vez más a ciudadelas medievales. Encerrados en su burbuja cognitiva, abandonaron el bien común y denominan “deplorables” a las clases populares. Esta situación significa que las categorías populares, que ayer fueron la base de la clase media, ya no son referentes culturales, sino personas a las que uno no se debería parecer. El problema es que no se puede ‘hacer sociedad’ excluyendo a las clases populares mayoritarias. Este modelo no es socialmente sostenible ni duradero.

P. Hay un trasvase habitual desde la clase trabajadora hacia la pobreza, pero también desde las clases medias hacia el proletariado. La inseguridad social es una constante y solo una parte pequeña de la sociedad parece estar a salvo de ella.

R. De hecho, existe un vínculo orgánico entre la pobreza y las clases trabajadoras. Siempre digo que en el ‘Monopoly de las clases populares‘, hay casillas de pobreza cada dos de ellas. Por lo tanto, las clases trabajadoras tienen un 80% de probabilidad de caer al menos una vez en su vida en la casilla de la pobreza. Esto no significa que permanezcan siempre allí, porque la pobreza rara vez es un estado permanente, pero eso no significa tampoco que la movilidad sea en las dos direcciones y que algún día pasen a una clase social superior. Es algo que han integrado cultural y materialmente y que ven cómo afecta a sus vecinos, a sus padres, a sus hijos o a sus amigos. Esta situación es aún más pronunciada hoy porque las clases populares (y esta es la primera vez en la historia) ya no viven donde se crean empleo y riqueza. Cuando pierdes tu trabajo en estas áreas rurales, pueblos pequeños o ciudades medianas, es muy difícil encontrar otro. Por el contrario, las élites y las clases altas están protegidas porque viven en ciudadelas, en estas grandes ciudades donde sí se crean empleos y riqueza.

En España existe un potencial de protesta social y política idéntico al que se ha dado en Francia o Reino Unido

P. La mayoría de las personas solo quieren vivir decentemente de su trabajo y ser respetadas culturalmente, afirma. El problema es que ese deseo, para llevarse a la práctica, implica profundos cambios políticos y económicos. Casi una revolución.

R. El punto esencial es el del reconocimiento cultural. Las clases dominantes ahora deben aceptar que hay un pueblo en Francia, Estados Unidos o España, y que va a estar ahí durante mucho tiempo. Más que en una ‘revolución’ (que es el título del libro-programa de Macron), creo en la potencia del movimiento real de la sociedad, el que es iniciado por el mayor número de personas, las de las clases populares. La revolución que estamos viendo es la del gran retorno de las clases populares a los campos político y cultural. Esta ‘revolución lenta’ dibuja una confrontación democrática entre el mundo de arriba’ y el mundo de abajo.

P. ¿Los chalecos amarillos son un movimiento que llegará tarde o temprano a España?

R. Los chalecos amarillos, como los ‘brexiters’, van a estar ahí 100 años más. No son un accidente de la historia sino la consecuencia de un modelo de desigualdad que produce en España las mismas fracturas. En vuestro país existe un potencial de protesta social y política idéntico al que existe en Francia o Reino Unido.

La desaparición de la clase media hará desaparecer lógicamente los partidos tradicionales. Es inevitable

La precarización de la clase media española y la dinámica de concentración de la riqueza y el empleo conducen a una recomposición social y política que va a producir efectos en los años venideros. El eje izquierda/derecha, que todavía es poderoso en España, no va a impedir una recomposición política a partir de la oposición entre ganadores y perdedores de la globalización, entre los ‘somewhere’ los ‘nowhere’, como los denomina David Goodhardt, entre la periferia española y las grandes ciudades globalizadas. Este eje fundamental es el del siglo XXI e incluso sobrepasa la cuestión independentista. Por ejemplo, la independencia de Cataluña no eliminaría la división social y territorial entre la Cataluña periférica y Barcelona.

P. ¿Sobrevivirá la democracia a este capitalismo globalizado?

R. No estamos viviendo el final de la democracia sino un tiempo de recomposición política. La desaparición de la clase media hará desaparecer lógicamente los partidos tradicionales que la representaban. La recomposición política que estamos presenciando es consecuencia de la recomposición social, y es inevitable.

Los medios de comunicación y el mundo académico producen sobre todo pequeños Torquemadas

Un partido político es principalmente una sociología, pero también una geografía. Cuando la sociología evoluciona, algunos partidos desaparecen y aparecen otros. Macron y Trump no son un accidente de la historia, sino el producto de la gran recomposición social, geográfica y política que afecta a todos los países occidentales.

P. ¿Los medios de comunicación y el mundo académico tienen una alianza? ¿Designan herejes? ¿Es usted uno de ellos?

R. Los medios de comunicación y el mundo académico producen sobre todo pequeños Torquemadas. Pero esta inquisición suscita muchas resistencias en los medios populares y ahora también en los círculos intelectuales. A partir de ahora va a ser difícil negar la realidad. La mayoría de los expertos y de los comentaristas recogen mis análisis sobre la Francia periférica y la recomposición política en torno al bloque burgués/bloque popular. Los medios de comunicación y el mundo académico han perdido hoy su hegemonía cultural y tendrán que adaptarse. Torquemada ha perdido su poder.

Guerra y paz. Animal herido

The plight of the whole army resembled that of a wounded animal which feels it is perishing and does not know what it is doing. To study the skillful tactics and aims of Napoleon and his army from the time it entered Moscow till it was destroyed is like studying the dying leaps and shudders of a mortally wounded animal. Very often a wounded animal, hearing a rustle, rushes straight at the hunter’s gun, runs forward and back again, and hastens its own end. Napoleon, under pressure from his whole army, did the same thing. The rustle of the battle of Tarutino frightened the beast, and it rushed forward onto the hunter’s gun, reached him, turned back, and finally- like any wild beast- ran back along the most disadvantageous and dangerous path, where the old scent was familiar.

During the whole of that period Napoleon, who seems to us to have been the leader of all these movements- as the figurehead of a ship may seem to a savage to guide the vessel- acted like a child who, holding a couple of strings inside a carriage, thinks he is driving it.

 

 

La situación del ejército era semejante a la de un animal herido que presiente su fin y no sabe qué hacer. Estudiar las hábiles maniobras de Napoleón y el objetivo perseguido desde su entrada en Moscú hasta el aniquilamiento de su ejército es lo mismo que estudiar el significado de los saltos y convulsiones de un animal herido de muerte. Muy a menudo el animal herido, al oír el más leve ruido, se lanza bajo los disparos del cazador, corre hacia delante, retrocede, y anticipa así su propio fin. Napoleón hizo lo mismo bajo la presión de todo su ejército. El eco de la batalla de Tarútino había espantado a la bestia. Corrió hasta ponerse a tiro, llegó donde estaba el cazador, volvió sobre sus pasos y por último, como todo animal, corrió por el camino más peligroso y difícil, siguiendo un rastro viejo y conocido.

Napoleón, que parece ser el organizador de todo aquel movimiento (así como el mascarón de proa, para el salvaje, es la fuerza que dirige la nave), durante ese período de su actuación fue semejante a un niño que, tirando de los cordones del interior de una carroza, se imagina que la dirige.

About Christian passivity and pacifism

Comment to https://web.archive.org/web/20190618172115/https://socialpathology.blogspot.com/2019/06/christian-buddhism.html

Very insightful commentary. Like you, I am a Roman Catholic and I loathe this modern Christian passivity. We behave like a lamb to the slaughter.

Having said that, I wonder if there is not something else. Jesus was not a warrior and suffered like a lamb to the slaughter («The Lamb of God»). The apostles were not warriors either. Stephen, like Jesus, died saying «“Lord, don’t blame them for what they have done.” (Acts 7, 59). So Christian knights don’t have precedents in the New Testament (you should go back to the Old Testament: Maccabees, King David) but Christian Buddhists do.

Compare this to Islam. Mohammed was a warrior and their disciples were warriors too. Islam conquered by the sword (they wanted the blood of infidels). In Christianity, we want our own blood («the blood of martyrs is the seed of Christians»).

I think that, besides industrialization and urbanization, another cause is the Protestant reformation and the extension of literacy. This produced the frequent reading of the Bible. When you read the New Testament, it is difficult to argue for Christian war. But medieval Christian knights didn’t have such a problem. They didn’t read the New Testament.

What do you think?


But blessed are the meek, peacemakers etc… I struggle to find a scripture passage of equal clarity and authority about the need for lionocity.


There are such passages but there are few and not that clear. Jesus getting angry, Jesus driving the Traders from the Temple, «Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword.» Matthew 10:34 (but the context does not seem to support Christian war).